An Emergency Power Off (EPO) system is a control mechanism, formally known as a “disconnecting means.” It is intended to power down a single piece of electronic equipment or up to an entire installation from a single point. This white paper describes the advantages and disadvantages of EPO for protecting data centers and small IT equipment rooms containing uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems. Various codes and standards that require EPO are discussed. Recommended practices are suggested for the use of EPO with UPS systems.
Emergency Power Off (EPO), formally known as a “disconnecting means”, is almost exclusively a United States requirement. It is a safety mechanism that can be used to power down a single piece of electrical equipment or up to an entire room of equipment in an emergency, in order to protect personnel and facilities. An EPO system consists of two main components:

- the disconnecting means itself
- the remote controls

Because the main disconnect device might not be readily accessible during an emergency situation, a remote EPO control station provides the means to power down the electronic equipment from a safe distance. In an emergency, a single means to rapidly disconnect power to an entire room might also be preferred over operating multiple disconnect devices, such as might be the case in a complex information technology (IT) environment.

EPO can be used either by emergency responders or by equipment operators. EPO provides firefighters a quick way to guarantee that emergency responders are not exposed to dangerous voltages and to eliminate electricity as a source of energy feeding combustion. There is no formal mechanism for reporting or documenting EPO-initiated data center shutdowns, but anecdotal evidence indicates that more than ninety percent of such events are unintended. Common causes are:

- accidental operation
- deliberate sabotage
- mistaken use (hit the “wrong button”)
- mis-wiring
- accidental short during maintenance

All of these (with the exception of deliberate sabotage) fall in the category of human error.

The EPO system in any data center is a subsystem that facility managers and operations personnel hope to never use. There can be extremely serious consequences associated with abruptly shutting down a data center. The most obvious is lost productivity. On-line transactions can be terminated and possibly lost. Restarting the information technology equipment (ITE) following an abrupt shutdown can sometimes take many hours. There is a high risk of damage to some IT equipment, which might be immediate or it might show up as intermittent failures caused by thermal stress long after power is restored. Replacing lost equipment can take as long as days or months, depending upon the type of equipment and the extent of damage. Some operations require a sequential shut-down to ensure safe operation. Other applications might affect emergency services, other critical control operations, or life safety. Besides suffering customer dissatisfaction, some businesses might suffer huge economic loss and/or litigation, or even regulatory penalties.

EPO is a subsystem that is specifically designed to override all redundancy and fault tolerance built into the data center physical infrastructure, thereby potentially putting an entire network at risk. It is estimated that between 25% and 50% of all unplanned data center shutdowns (crashes) are the result of EPO activation. The design of an EPO system must therefore try to prevent any possibility of accidental operation, and it must minimize deliberate operation for any reason other than a valid life-threatening emergency.
National regulations and local codes can govern installations. EPO system design is affected by both product and installation safety guidelines. Applicable product standards relating to EPO systems on large uninterruptible power supply (UPS) systems are as follows:

**Underwriters Laboratory - UL 1778-2:** "A battery supply for a UPS provided with a marking indicating that it is suitable for use in a computer room shall incorporate a battery disconnect and a means for connection to the remote emergency power off circuit that disconnects the battery power source. The battery shall be disconnected within five minutes of the activation of the remote emergency power off circuit.

**EN50091:** This European UPS standard requires an EPO on any hard-wired UPS. However, the EPO may be integral to the UPS; Activation from remote EPO stations at exit doors is not mandatory.

Local authorities might require that installed equipment meet the above standards before it can be operated. In addition, local authorities might require that the installation meet some or all of the following requirements:

**IEC 364-4-46:** This international standard titled: "Electrical installations of buildings part 4: protection for safety" requires that a "means shall be provided for emergency switching of any part of an installation where it may be necessary to control the supply to remove unexpected danger." Although not explicitly referenced, computer rooms are considered to be such an installation. Furthermore, "the arrangement of the emergency switching shall be such that its operation does not introduce a further danger or interfere with the complete operation necessary to remove the danger." This suggests that it should be possible to shut down only the affected equipment (e.g., an equipment rack or a zone), and not the entire data center.

**National Fire Protection Association - NFPA 70:** This U.S. document, also called the National Electrical Code® (NEC®), specifies in clauses 645-10 and 645-11 that UPSs above 750 VA installed within information technology rooms must be provided with "a means to disconnect power to all electronic equipment in the information technology equipment room or in designated zones." This includes all UPS ac and dc supply and output circuits. "The disconnecting means shall also disconnect the battery from its load." The intent is that all power must be removed, not only to the loads on the output of the UPS, but within the UPS itself. The EPO shall also be required to "disconnect the power to all dedicated HVAC systems serving the room or designated zones and shall cause all required fire / smoke dampers to close." Where multiple zones are created, each zone must have an approved means to confine fire or products of combustion to within the zone."

Note that when a UPS is located outside of the ITE room the NEC does not require the battery to be disconnected. It is only when the UPS is in the ITE room that the battery must be disconnected. The rest of the time it is permissible to open the feeders into the ITE room from a UPS output switchboard, or to trip the first disconnect device in the room (for example, the input circuit breaker on a power distribution unit [PDU] fed from a UPS).

The terms “emergency power off” or “EPO” are not used in the NEC. We use the term throughout this document because it is the jargon with which everybody in the ITE industry is familiar. The formal term is “remote disconnect controls”, referring to the controls that cause the appropriate circuit device (typically the shunt trip on a circuit breaker) to operate. This code further requires that “remote disconnect controls shall be grouped, identified, and readily accessible in case of fire to authorized personnel and emergency responders.” Earlier editions of the NEC required the control stations to be located by principal exit doors. In 2011 the code was modified to allow the remote disconnect control(s) to be located in any location acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction (AHJ), such as in a security office or a network operations center. Remote disconnect controls are not required for “critical operations data systems” when they meet certain criteria, such as when written procedures,
continuous operation by trained staff, and smoke-detection and fire suppression systems are in place.

An EPO system is only mandatory if the room is designated for information technology equipment. The lack of an EPO system disqualifies the room from being classified as an ITE space, in which case the room must comply with the standard requirements for building wiring and cabling. NFPA 70 disallows some of the leniencies otherwise permitted in Article 645 (such as allowing non-plenum-rated power cables under a raised floor).

Although a single EPO device, such as a pushbutton, is permitted, two or more devices should be provided for each zone when disconnecting means is required. As quoted above, one is for power to the IT equipment, and the other is for power to the HVAC equipment. A zone is “a physically identifiable area (such as barriers or separation by distance) within an information technology equipment room, with dedicated power and cooling systems for the ITE or systems.” There can be as many zones as are acceptable to the AHJ, and each can have its own EPO system located somewhere in the building.

National Fire Protection Association - NFPA 75: This document, titled "Standard for the Protection of Information Technology Equipment", incorporates the related clauses of NFPA 70 and therefore contains identical requirements. It is a standard, not a code, so compliance is therefore not mandatory. However, because NFPA 75 is referenced several times within the NEC, both NFPA 70 and NFPA 75 should be used together. Note that NFPA 76, which applies to fire protection within telecommunications facilities, does not have an EPO requirement.

One of the most confusing areas for IT professionals is a determination of what constitutes a "data center" and whether an EPO system is required. In particular, how big or complex does an installation need to be before it comes under the legal definition of a "data center"? Can a wiring closet be considered a "data center"?

Because NFPA 70 is the primary requirement for EPO in data centers, we look to it for guidance. It does not use the term “data center.” It describes an “information technology equipment room” as one within an "ITE area". Per NEC-2014, a room must meet all of the following conditions in order to qualify for ITE room designation.

1. A means (EPO) is provided to disconnect power to all electronic equipment and HVAC equipment in the room (see the previous section).
2. The room is separated from other occupancies by fire-resistant rated walls, floors and ceilings with protected openings.
3. A separate HVAC system is dedicated to the room. Any HVAC system that serves other occupancies shall be permitted to also serve the information technology room if fire / smoke dampers are provided at the point of penetration of the room boundary. Such dampers shall operate on activation of smoke detectors and also by operation of the disconnecting means (EPO) for HVAC systems.
4. All information technology and communications equipment installed in the room is "listed."
5. Only those personnel needed for the maintenance and functional operation of the installed equipment can occupy or have access to the room.
6. The room contains only the electrical equipment and wiring associated with the operation of the ITE room.

Based on the above definition, small installations with only a few servers and wiring closets do not typically have all of the above characteristics and are not therefore considered “information technology equipment rooms,” by this code. They might be called "computer
rooms," "data centers," "network equipment rooms," or some other designation. However, the owner should seriously weigh the advantages and disadvantages of an EPO system. In some cases it might make sense to have an EPO system to protect against serious injury or damage in case of fire or other emergencies. EPO is desirable for safety, but EPO is undesirable for system availability.

The ultimate decision to require an EPO system, and how it is permitted to be accomplished, might be made by the authority having jurisdiction (code inspector). Item (1) above requires disconnection of power to all electronic equipment in an IT Equipment room. Whether or not all power to the room must be disconnected, including incoming power feeders, is subject to interpretation by local authorities. Some inspectors might require that all power feeds to the information technology room must be disconnected by the main breakers located outside of the IT equipment room. In some ITE or UPS equipment designs, upstream disconnect might be the only way to achieve it.

An EPO system might not be required when the nature of the IT equipment’s mission is such that its disruption could decrease safety or increase danger. For example, NEC article 685 says EPO is not required when sequential shutdown is required to ensure safety or prevent serious damage. Telecommunications operations are not required to have EPO when disruption of service would affect safety, such as access to 9-1-1 emergency services. Some exemptions have also been granted by local inspectors when it could be demonstrated that shut-down would have severe financial consequences and that the intent of the code could be met by other safety features and/or practices.

The NEC and NFPA 75 both state, "A means shall be provided to disconnect power to all electronic equipment. The disconnecting means shall also disconnect the battery from the load." For a UPS with an integral battery, the NFPA 75 requirement is satisfied by having an EPO system that shuts off the UPS output. For a UPS with a remote battery, the battery power must be disconnected by the EPO system because a UPS is considered electronic equipment and its dc sources and ac sources must be disconnected. The intent of the code is to prevent a situation in which an emergency responder disconnects power, only to discover that circuits are still energized because they are powered from a UPS system.

If the UPS is inside the data center, then achieving EPO by disconnecting input power to the UPS will not disconnect AC output power. In this case the UPS will interpret this event as a power failure and simply continue to supply power from its associated battery. Just tripping the UPS output breakers also does not meet EPO requirements, as the UPS itself remains energized even though the loads may be shut down. An EPO system that trips the UPS input breakers and DC battery breakers would be necessary. The EPO design should therefore be capable of tripping the breakers feeding main and bypass input power to the data center and DC battery breakers (if battery is not integral to the UPS). It is also recommended to trip UPS output breakers when the EPO is activated in order to prevent exposing loads to a surge upon restoration of power.

NFPA 70 formerly stipulates that the actuation of emergency controls using pushbutton(s) must be accomplished by pushing the button(s) in, rather than pulling them out. As explained in the NEC-2009 Handbook, the requirement recognized that, "in an emergency situation, the intuitive reaction to operating the control is to push, not to pull, the button." This language was added to the NEC in response to some remote EPO designs in which a “pull-to-activate” button was used in order to prevent accidental operation. A pushbutton with a cover is the preferred alternative. This “push to operate” requirement was deleted in the 2011 edition of the NEC. Note that the control does not have to be a pushbutton (even though that is the most common method). Any type of switch capable of activating a relay or similar device is permitted.
It is important to distinguish between a “unit EPO” and a “remote EPO (REPO).” The “unit EPO” is located on a piece of equipment. The REPO (or remote disconnect control) is typically located at exit doors or some other location away from the equipment that it controls. NFPA 70 and other codes generally are concerned with REPO.

A unit EPO function is a common feature in UPSs over 5 kVA and is often available as an option on many smaller units. In some cases, a unit EPO can be retrofitted as a plug-in accessory to a standard UPS. However, the implementation of EPO varies among different UPS. System design work may be needed to integrate the UPS unit EPO with existing data center remote EPO controls. Although this is not complicated, it is important to note that integration is usually not a simple plug-in installation. Consult the application or installation notes for the specific UPS.

On larger UPS systems, the primary UPS breakers are contained in a bypass panel, bypass panel / power distribution unit (PDU) or switchboard. The REPO function on larger systems must therefore be able to trip multiple breakers in order to disconnect all power to and from the UPS.

Activating the remote EPO switch (e.g., pushing the button) instantaneously shuts down power to all connected equipment in the installation. Power cannot be restored at the REPO switch, but must be reset either at the circuit breaker panels or at the load equipment after a determination has been made that it is safe to do so.

In the most basic form, the remote EPO switch is wired back to special "remote trip" or "shunt trip" circuit breakers in the UPS system. The circuit breakers are equipped with optional "trip coils" which are driven by the REPO circuit. The shunt trip unit consists of a solenoid tripping device mounted in the breaker. The tripping device must be energized by some control power source of AC or DC voltage. When a pilot device, such as a push button, remotely energizes the solenoid coil, the plunger moves to activate the trip bar to trip the breaker. At the same time a cut-off switch operates, disconnecting power to the solenoid and preventing coil burn out. Breakers with shunt trip capability have terminals for connecting the shunt trip control voltage. The shunt trip coils of multiple breakers can be connected in parallel so that a single remote EPO push button can trip many breakers.

There is no code requirement or standard mandating normally-open or normally-closed contacts on the EPO device, although normally-open is most common. Shunt trip breakers trip when the EPO circuit is closed (or opened). Multiple EPO switches can be connected in parallel (or series) to multiple paralleled breakers so that any EPO switch trips all breakers. Care must be taken to ensure that all devices in a circuit operate identically.

Remote trip breakers trip when a control voltage is applied to them. A source of voltage, typically 24 or 48 V AC or DC is required. However, some breakers use 120 volt or 240 volt ac or dc coils. These can be operated directly from the line. The AC shunt trip control voltage can have a frequency of 50 Hz or 60 Hz. The standards do not specify any particular voltage for shunt trip control in order to allow flexibility in design. Although the shunt trip control voltage can vary in different circuit breakers, the basic operation of the shunt trip unit remains the same.

In contrast to a shunt trip, Undervoltage Release (UVR) is an alternate means available to trip a circuit breaker. As the name implies, the UVR mechanism trips the breaker whenever the control voltage falls below a predetermined level. Like shunt trip units, UVRs are available with a wide variety of control voltage ratings. The UVR consists of a solenoid with a plunger and tripping lever. The UVR mechanism is reset by the tripping lever when normal control voltage has been restored and the circuit breaker handle is moved to the “OFF” position. UVR equipped circuit breakers are frequently used when a normally closed circuit is desired.
Understanding EPO and Its Downtime Risks

for EPO design. UVR is desirable from a safety perspective because it fails into the open (de-energized) position. However, UVR is undesirable from an availability perspective because it is vulnerable to nuisance tripping caused by a momentary voltage sag or interruption.

From a safety standpoint it is absolutely essential that the EPO works when needed. Two different design approaches can be used: one with normally open (NO) contacts and the other with normally closed (NC) contacts (indicating the respective open or closed position of the contacts when the coil is de-energized). Each of these designs has its own tradeoffs between reliability and safety.

An EPO design with NO contacts uses one normally open contact for each circuit breaker to be tripped. Depressing the EPO pushbutton closes the contact (energizes the circuit) to trip the breaker. Multiple NO contacts are closed by the EPO pushbutton to trip multiple breakers in the information technology equipment room. A broken wire would not be detected by this EPO design. However, a broken wire would not cause a nuisance trip since the contacts are normally open.

An EPO design with NC contacts uses one normally closed contact for each breaker to be tripped. An EPO push button in this design will open the contact to trip the breaker. Multiple NC contacts can be opened by an EPO pushbutton to trip multiple breakers in the information technology equipment room. If a wire gets broken, it would trigger an EPO event in this type of design. However, if the pair of wires connected to the NC contact is shorted then the connected breaker would not trip in case of an emergency.

Users may be required by local regulatory authorities to demonstrate EPO functionality during commissioning and/or by periodic tests. It would be highly desirable to have a selection switch on the UPS and ancillary equipment that enables the EPO to be checked periodically by setting the switch to a “test” position. In the “test” position the EPO can be activated and the EPO functionality tested without actually shutting the system down and disconnecting the load. After the EPO test, the switch can be set to its “normal” position.

The complexity of the EPO design and associated reliability depends on the size of the installation. A simple EPO push button can be employed for a few pieces of UPS equipment using a set of contacts wired serially to each remote EPO station. This approach is adequate for 2-3 circuits, but it gets laborious and is less reliable for a larger installation. For a data center with multiple UPS components it becomes necessary to design a controller that can trip multiple breakers at the same time. If the controller power supply fails, then the EPO will not function when needed. A UPS can be used to back up the EPO control power supply to increase reliability. However, this increases the complexity of the EPO system and the number of failure modes. In addition, periodic maintenance of the EPO controller would also be required to check the status of UPS battery and other components. An alternative approach would be to design an EPO with passive components that can still reliably trip all associated equipment.

Data centers or small information technology equipment rooms may have multiple UPS and associated equipment. Since one UPS system may or may not be galvanically isolated from the others, there should be independent contacts for breaker shunt trip or UVR. An important design consideration is whether or not to use a powered EPO device with relays. If the EPO device requires input power, then a UPS would be necessary to make sure that the EPO is ready and functional at all times.
An alternate approach is to use normally open contacts and use an EPO mechanism (e.g., a pushbutton) that closes multiple independent contacts to initiate EPO function. Such an EPO device would not need any input power. When using multiple EPO devices, it is highly desirable to have pre-made and tested cable harnesses for interconnection that enhances ease of installation and reliability.

EPO devices designed around human factors provide two important benefits:

1. Lower probability of failure due to installation mistakes thus improving the reliability of EPO system operation
2. Lower probability of false trips due to human error, thus increasing the availability of IT operations

The ideal EPO device should be aesthetically pleasing, easy to install and have intuitive operation. The EPO device should have sufficient room to neatly route and dress wiring connections inside the EPO enclosure. This reduces the likelihood of miswiring by allowing the installer to keep track of all wiring and to see all terminations from one angle. It is also important for the EPO device to be able to trip the main breaker feeding the information technology room. These contacts must be able to accommodate various shunt trip voltages up to 240 V ac.

Figure 1a shows a standard industrial EPO push button device with depths ranging from 6 to 9 inches (15.24 to 22.86 cm). The contacts of the push button are normally stacked in the back making the depth larger as the number of contacts increases. An example of an EPO device with a 2 inch depth (5.08 cm) is shown in Figure 1b.

Figure 1a (left)
Standard EPO, 6”- 9” depth

1b (right)
EPO, 2” depth

EPO devices should allow for mounting with conduit on the surface of the wall or inside the wall as shown in Figures 2a and 2b, respectively.
As shown in Figure 3a, the wiring inside a standard industrial EPO device typically terminates on the contacts clustered around the push button. The resulting congestion makes it cumbersome to wire and thereby decreases the reliability. EPO devices should allow support for multiple UPS and for tripping one additional circuit breaker (shunt trip up to 240 V AC), which can be the main breaker feeding power to the information technology room. In addition, the wiring inside the device should be intuitive and spacious to allow for organized wire dressing. These features decrease the chance of installation errors and thus increase the reliability of EPO operation. An example of such a device is shown in Figure 3b.

If multiple EPO devices are needed, then the EPO device, like the one shown in Figure 3a, will require discrete parallel wires run between individual EPO devices. If an information technology room needs three such EPO devices then the parallel wiring will make this system very messy and unreliable. Alternatively, Figure 3b shows the parallel connection of EPO devices using pre-assembled CAT-5 cables. The internal connections are done on a printed circuit board. The CAT-5 cables can be obtained with specific lengths required at each location making the installation quick and reliable. Like all EPO connections, the CAT-5 cables should be securely run in conduit to prevent inadvertent disconnection from the EPO device.
Activation of the EPO can instantly shut down the entire information technology equipment room. There is something psychological about a single pushbutton located next to a door that tempts some people to push it. Sad but true, EPO operation as a deliberate act of sabotage occurs far more often than we would like to believe. Therefore, the design of the EPO system must prevent accidental closure and discourage non-emergency use or deliberate sabotage, yet it must still allow its operation by a person with a disability. Techniques commonly deployed include:

**Pushbutton protection**

1. *Guarded pushbutton* - This method recesses the button slightly within a metal tube. It is the least expensive and least effective method.

2. *Covered pushbutton, hinged cover* - This method is the most widely used. It employs a hinged transparent cover that must be lifted to operate the button (see Figure 1b or Figure 6).

3. *Covered pushbutton, break glass* - This method is psychologically intimidating to the casual button-pusher. It requires the operator to use a small hammer to break a glass window to access the pushbutton. Although psychologically effective, it is expensive to install, difficult to test, and expensive to use (requires replacement of glass), and is therefore not widely deployed.

4. *Lock and key* - This method has the advantage of preventing operation by unauthorized personnel by using a key instead of a button. However, this method has obvious safety disadvantages. For example, it could not be used by a fire fighter, and the process of locating and inserting the key could take up valuable time in a true emergency. Therefore this method is rarely used.
Selector switch. This method uses a knob instead of a pushbutton to ensure that activation is deliberate. The preferred method is a three-position switch that allows bypass. A variation may also include a hinged cover or other means to discourage unintended or unwanted operation.

Remote EPO station location

1. A good REPO design will minimize the number of similar devices in the same location.
2. The REPO station should be clearly separate from any other pushbuttons or controls (for example, on the opposite side of a door).
3. The REPO station should be located far enough to the side of a door to prevent its being accidentally bumped or damaged (for example, by equipment being moved through a door).
4. No equipment should obstruct access to the REPO station or pose a possibility of accidental activation (such as a copy machine in front of a pushbutton).
5. The REPO station should not be located where its purpose could possibly be misunderstood (for example, as a door opener).
6. The REPO station is permitted to be someplace other than in the ITE room (such as in a continuously staffed security station or in a utility service entrance equipment room); It must help – not hinder – a firefighter responding to a fire in the ITE room.

Signage and security

1. At a minimum, REPO stations should have clearly visible signs. “EMERGENCY POWER OFF” is certainly the most common, but it may be an invitation to somebody inclined to deliberate sabotage. Other wording might be “ITE DISCONNECT” or similar, less conspicuous terminology.
2. Contacts that close when the REPO controls are activated can tie into a management system, thereby creating a record of the exact time and location when the EPO event occurred.
3. An audible alarm, siren, and/or a flashing light can be activated when the REPO is activated. Mounting these devices conspicuously above the REPO station sends a psychological message to the operator to only push the button in a true emergency. Some sites add a sign warning “EMERGENCY POWER OFF - Pushing this button will sound a siren.”
4. Cameras can also be a deterrent to casual operation. Some sites monitor all doors and EPO stations 24/7 with video cameras. Others add a flash camera and a sign warning, “If you push this button we will take your picture. Push this button only in a true emergency,” in order to dissuade curiosity or sabotage.

It is highly recommended to fully test the EPO system as part of the commissioning phase of a project, and periodically thereafter (e.g., annually). More often than not, EPO systems are designed to be site-specific and are not fully tested with all the equipment they are supposed to protect because of site testing limitations. It is therefore desirable to have a test function built into the remote EPO device. An example of an EPO test function is shown in Figure 5, in which each individual circuit on the REPO device can be tested by pressing the appropriate micro switches.
Another desirable feature in an EPO system is the ability to create a record of which device was activated to assist in a subsequent root cause investigation. On a sophisticated “active” microcontroller-based REPO device, this is accomplished by communication to the Building Management System. On a “passive” REPO device that does not have any input power and microcontroller, two options are available for indicating when the device is activated. First, a REPO push button can be a latching type which provides one indication of activation of the device. Secondly, the REPO device can have a red (or other conspicuous) flag that drops down as soon as the protective cover over the push button is lifted for EPO activation as shown in Figure 6.
Conclusion

An EPO system is an important safety mechanism for UPS equipment within a data center, but it also poses a great risk to the reliability of the information technology equipment. Remote Emergency Power Off (REPO) stations might be required by code in some jurisdictions and in some applications. This paper has discussed various codes and standards that require the use of an EPO system. In addition, careful attention must be paid to design features of the REPO device such as size, type of contacts, wiring neatness, complexity, cost, security, etc. The EPO system must also be fully tested with the information technology facility that it protects. Following recommended practices for an EPO system will increase reliability and reduce human error.

About the author

Stephen McCluer is a Senior Manager for external codes and standards at Schneider Electric. He has 35 years of experience in the power protection industry, and is a member of NFPA, ICC, IAEI, ASHRAE, The Green Grid, BICSI, and the IEEE Standards Council. He serves on a number of committees within those organizations, is a frequent speaker at industry conferences, and authors technical papers and articles on power quality topics. He served on a task group to rewrite the requirements for information technology equipment in the National Electrical Code.
Understanding EPO and Its Downtime Risks

Resources
Click on icon to link to resource

White Paper Library
whitepapers.apc.com

TradeOff Tools™
tools.apc.com

Contact us
For feedback and comments about the content of this white paper:

Data Center Science Center
DCSC@Schneider-Electric.com

If you are a customer and have questions specific to your data center project:

Contact your Schneider Electric representative